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Griswold v. 
Connecticut
Gonzales v. Carhart Lawrence v. Texas
“Privacy” again?1 I’m afraid so, but I come to bury the benighted doctrine, 
not to praise it. It lived a tough life. Its best deed—freeing millions of American 
women from a Hobson’s choice2—hardly went unpunished. Its father was 
branded an incautious fabulist and a womanizer.3 Its size and scope were ever 
changing, its very existence under attack even from its sympathizers.4 As for its 
enemies, they long ago took to name-calling. In a 1981 memo to Attorney 
General William French Smith, a young Justice Department lawyer named John 
                                                  
† Associate Professor of Law, Columbia Law School; J.D., 2005, Yale Law School. The author 
served as a law clerk to the Hon. John Paul Stevens during the October 2006 Supreme Court 
Term. Thanks to Vaughn Blackman, Suzanne Goldberg, Elora Mukherjee, Andrew Siegel, Neil 
Siegel, and the staff of the UC Davis Law Review for helpful comments and suggestions.  
1 Charles L. Black, Jr., 
, 81 HARV. L. REV. 69, 69 (1967) (“‘State action’ again?”).
2 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
3 BRUCE ALLEN MURPH Y, WILD BILL: THE LEGEND AND LIFE O F WILLIAM O. DOUG LAS
(2003).
4 WHAT SHOULD HAVE SAID (Jack M. Balkin ed., 2005) (collecting 
alternative, ostensibly better, opinions from legal scholars).
The So-Called Right to Privacy
Jamal Greene†
Introduction
The constitutional right to privacy has been a conservative bugaboo ever 
since Justice Douglas introduced it into the United States Reports in 
. Reference to the “so-called” right to privacy has become code for 
the view that the right is doctrinally recognized but not in fact constitutionally 
enshrined. This Article argues that the constitutional right to privacy is no more. 
The two rights most associated historically with the right to privacy are abortion 
and intimate sexual conduct, yet and 
made clear that neither of these rights is presently justified by its proponents on 
the Court as aspects of constitutional privacy. Other rights that might be 
protected by a constitutional right to privacy, such as the right to refuse medical 
treatment or the right to assisted suicide, are either justified on liberty grounds or 
are not constitutionally protected at all. The Court’s move from privacy to liberty 
as a constitutional basis for the freedom to make fundamental life decisions 
strengthens the rights themselves by anchoring them to constitutional text in a 
text-happy era, and represents a victory for Justice Stevens, who has long 
advocated such a shift.
Cf. Foreword: State Action, Equal Protection, and California’s 
Proposition 14
See
See
See generally ROE V. WADE
Roe
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Roberts wrote of the “so-called ‘right to privacy’”;5 the same epithet appears in 
the 1988 Justice Department Guidelines on Constitutional Litigation6 and in 
Justice Scalia’s dissenting opinion in .7
This Article argues that they protest too much. The doctrinal life of the 
constitutional right to privacy is over. By that I do not mean that there is no 
constitutional protection against unreasonable search or seizure or against 
compelled disclosure of private information. These constitutional rights live on 
under the rubric of the Fourth and First Amendments and are not the intended 
targets of the long-running assault on the right to privacy. Nor do I mean that the 
privileges that the right to privacy has served to protect—paradigmatically the 
rights to reproductive choice, including abortion, and to intimate sexual 
relationships—no longer enjoy constitutional status. Plainly, they do. What I 
mean, rather, is that those privileges no longer owe that status to any putative 
right to privacy. The right to obtain an abortion is now conceptualized by its 
defenders either in terms of women’s equality or, non-exclusively, as a specific 
application of a constitutional liberty right to make fundamental life decisions. 
The rights to use contraception and to participate in a consensual non-commercial 
sexual relationship are also defended as aspects of the right to liberty protected 
against state abridgement by the due process clause. The projects and activities 
the right to privacy was crafted to protect owe it a debt of gratitude, but the right 
to privacy as such has no clothes.
This should be cause for celebration among progressives and libertarians.
Privacy was never an apt moniker for the rights they have characteristically 
sought to protect. It is not impossible to construct a theoretical account that 
grounds a right to use contraception, to have an abortion, or to participate in 
intimate sexual relationships in a right to “privacy,” but doing so invites the 
troublesome corollary that the justice underlying these rights has anything at all to 
do with publicity, information-sharing, or discretion more generally. As 
importantly, the rights to equality and liberty can boast the textual hook that the 
right to privacy has always coveted. Beyond the intrinsic satisfaction of grounding 
constitutional rights in the text of the Constitution, this development has an 
obvious political benefit. To the extent the conservative textualist movement that 
Justice Scalia has pushed has won tactical turf battles over constitutional 
methodology, locating a textual basis for rights previously described under the 
privacy rubric beats back the infantry attack, even if it doesn’t quite win the war.8
                                                  
5 Memorandum from John Roberts to Att’y Gen. William French, Erwin Griswold 
Correspondence (Dec. 11, 1981).
6 Off. of Legal Pol’y, Dept. of Just., Guidelines on Constitutional Litigation 8 (1988).
7 539 U.S. 558, 594 (2003).
8 The daunting but not insuperable enigma of “substantive” due process remains.
Lawrence v. Texas
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Eroding privacy doctrine without eroding privacy rights also marks a 
significant victory for the jurisprudence of Justice Stevens. He has long expressed 
discomfort with the constitutional right to privacy, dating back to his tenure as a 
Seventh Circuit judge, when he complained that classifying the right to make 
fundamental life decisions as a “so-called right of marital privacy” was 
“unfortunate.”9 He reiterated that sentiment, more diplomatically, in his dissenting 
opinion in .10 When the Court finally overruled in 
, Justice Kennedy appeared to adopt Justice Stevens’s view, not once 
referring to the right to engage in consensual same-sex sodomy as an aspect of a 
constitutional right to privacy.11
This Article describes the life and declares the death of the constitutional 
right to privacy, with particular reference to the significant role Justice Stevens 
played in its demise. Part I briefly chronicles the history of the right, from Samuel 
Warren and Louis Brandeis’s celebrated recognition of the privacy tort in 1890,12
to Justice Douglas’s opinion in ,13 through its judicial 
invocations in ’s progeny and , and at last to its conspicuous 
absence in cases like and .14 This Part argues that 
the gradual transformation of the right to make fundamental personal decisions 
from an aspect of privacy emerging from the penumbrae of the Bill of Rights into 
an aspect of constitutional liberty and equality protected by the due process clause 
is now complete.
Part II locates the theoretical basis for that transformation within the 
jurisprudence of Justice Stevens. From his foundational Seventh Circuit opinion 
in ,15 to his dissenting opinion in , 
to his extrajudicial writings on the subject, Justice Stevens has long advocated an 
emphasis on what he terms the “liberty clause” of the Constitution in deciding 
fundamental decision cases. This approach vindicates the concurring 
opinions of Justices Harlan and White, though by affirming the rights to abortion 
and to same-sex intimacy, the Court has decisively rejected their constitutional 
conclusions and instead embraced the conclusions of Justice Stevens.
Part III explains why this doctrinal development is not only, as Justice 
Stevens might say, eminently reasonable,16 but also makes good political sense. 
                                                  
9 Fitzgerald v. Porter Memorial Hospital, 523 F.2d 716, 719, 721 (7th Cir. 1975), , 425 
U.S. 916 (1976).
10 478 U.S. 186, 214 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
11 , 539 U.S. at 577-78.
12 Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, , 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890).
13 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
14 550 U.S. 124 (2007).
15 523 F.2d 716.
16 A favorite expression of his. , Davis v. FEC, 128 S. Ct. 2759, 2779 (2008) (Stevens, J., 
dissenting); Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748, 776 (2005) (Stevens, J., dissenting); 
Bowers v. Hardwick Bowers
Lawrence
Griswold v. Connecticut
Griswold Bowers
Lawrence Gonzales v. Carhart
Fitzgerald v. Porter Memorial Hospital Bowers
Griswold
cert. denied
See Lawrence
The Right to Privacy
See, e.g.
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The right to privacy has become more symbol than substance. Its frequent 
invocation in confirmation hearings is entirely out of proportion to its significance 
in constitutional doctrine; it does no more than to signal, obliquely, comfort with 
or hostility to the continuing validity of .17 Partly in response to the 
politics of abortion, political conservatives have, with moderate success, built a 
movement around attacking the methodological grounding of abortion rights
(among others) in a non-originalist and non-textualist approach to interpretation.18
Abandoning the right to privacy liberates progressives simultaneously to support 
politically popular and, some would say, morally requisite constitutional claims 
such as the rights to contraception and to abortion, while at the same time 
distancing themselves from the formless, atextual, and much-maligned right to 
privacy.
Finally, Part IV discusses the implications of the doctrinal migration from 
privacy to liberty for other, as-yet unrecognized constitutional rights, particularly 
the rights to of same-sex couples to marry and to adopt children and the right of 
individuals to purchase and use sex toys. I contend that the change I have 
identified argues in favor of constitutional protection for the first two rights and 
against protection for the last. That bit of clarity should be welcome, regardless of 
one’s views on the rights themselves.
I begin with an obituary. This Part traces the right to privacy from its early 
years as a key figure in the Warren Court’s cautious embrace of unenumerated 
constitutional rights; to its role in creating a right to an abortion; to its gradual
abandonment by its opponents and, eventually, its supporters. The right to privacy 
is now dead, I argue, even as its contributions to constitutional law endure.
A. A Right is Born: 
The right to privacy is polysemous, and it is important to distinguish its 
many meanings before proceeding. The same label may refer to the right to 
prevent dissemination of one’s name, creative works, or photographic image; to 
be free from eavesdropping or physical search by government agents; to associate 
with others without unjustified intrusion or exposure by the state; or to exercise 
                                                                                                                                          
Miller v. Albright, 532 U.S. 420, 441 (1998); Melendez v. United States, 518 U.S. 120, 132 
(1996) (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment).
17 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
18 Jamal Greene, , 97 GEORGETOWN L.J. 657, 672–690 (2009).
Roe v. Wade
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reproductive or sexual freedom.19 The potential for confusion arises from the fact 
that these disparate rights share a common and relatively pedestrian ancestry. As 
Justice Black wrote in dissent in , recognizing a constitutional right of 
privacy “appears to be exalting a phrase which Warren and Brandeis used in 
discussing grounds for tort relief.”20
When Warren and Brandeis wrote of a right to privacy in their 1890 
article, they had in mind civil suits against gossip-mongers 
and paparazzi, not constitutional defenses against abortion prosecutions.21 Tort 
privacy is recognized in nearly every one of the fifty states,22 and it is not this 
Article’s ambition, nor could it be, to challenge it. Nor do I here call into question 
the Fourth Amendment’s continuing protection of one’s “reasonable expectation 
of privacy,” however shrinking that expectation might be.23 And the freedom to 
associate protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments still presupposes the 
right to do so in private.24 Each of these rights to privacy has been tugged at and 
remolded in the ordinary course of common-law adjudication, but none has wilted 
away.
The right to privacy this Article inters is the one Justice Douglas 
announced in his majority opinion in . The Court could have 
taken any number of doctrinal avenues to strike down Connecticut’s ban on 
contraceptives. It could have declared, in harmony with the opinions of Justice 
Harlan and Justice White, that the right of a married couple to use contraceptives 
is “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,” that the state’s criminal prohibition 
of that use is not sufficiently justified in light of the significance of that right, and 
that the Connecticut law therefore violated the due process clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.25 The Court might have bolstered that view, as Justice 
Goldberg urged, by reference to the Ninth Amendment, which provides that “the 
                                                  
19 Jamal Greene, Lawrence , 115 YALE L.J. 1862, 1884 
(2006).
20 , 381 U.S. at 510 n.1.
21 William L. Prosser, , 48 CAL. L. REV. 383, 383–84 (1960). 
22 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652A. Invasion of privacy encompasses the distinct torts of 
“unreasonable intrusion upon the seclusion of another, [or] appropriation of the other’s name or 
likeness [or] unreasonable publicity given to the other’s private life [or] publicity that 
unreasonably places the other in a false light before the public.” .
23 Jed Rubenfeld, , 61 STAN . L. REV. 101, 118 (2008). The phrase of course 
comes from Justice Harlan’s concurring opinion in , 389 U.S. 347, 361 
(1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
24 NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 460–66 (1958); . McIntyre v. Ohio Elec. Comm’n, 
514 U.S. 334 (1995) (protecting the right to distribute campaign literature anonymously).
25 , 381 U.S. at 500 (Harlan, J., concurring in the judgment) (quoting Palko v. 
Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937)); . at 502 (White, J., concurring in the judgment); 
Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 522 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
Griswold
Harvard Law Review
Griswold Griswold
See Beyond : Metaprivacy and Punishment
Griswold
See Privacy
Id
See The End of Privacy
Katz v. United States
See cf
Griswold
id see 
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enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny 
or disparage others retained by the people.”26
Justice Douglas chose none of the above. He instead married the view, 
typically associated with Justice Black, that the Fourteenth Amendment should be 
understood to apply the Bill of Rights to the states,27 to his own firmly held view
that “the Bill of Rights is not enough” and should therefore be interpreted broadly.
Douglas’s Madison Lecture of that title, an apparent response to Justice Black’s 
Madison Lecture of three years earlier, lamented the “default of the judiciary, as 
respects the Bill of Rights” and the erosion of civil rights by “[j]udge-made 
rules.”28 Privacy protected by the Bill of Rights, Justice Douglas seemed to say 
in , but not in so many words. The right to privacy is to the First, Third, 
Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Amendments what the right to association is to the First, 
an unspoken implication lying within the Amendment’s interstices and 
penumbras.29
Douglas’s initial draft in did not ground the right of a married 
couple to use contraceptives in a right to privacy, and the briefs had not urged a 
privacy-based holding. Rather, that first draft had treated the intimacies of the 
marital relationship as protected by the First Amendment right of association.30 It 
is ironic in retrospect that this narrower rationale likely would not have 
commanded a majority,31 for “penumbras and emanations” has become an in-joke 
around the law schools as shorthand for activist constitutional adjudication, an 
invitation for the Court “to protect those activities that enough Justices to form a 
majority think ought to be protected and not activities with which they have little 
sympathy.”32
But the initial criticism of Justice Douglas’s opinion—and there was 
plenty—went less to its promiscuity than to its inscrutability.33 Privacy has a 
common-sense connection to the marital bedroom, but as a doctrinal term of art it 
had never been used in quite this way. The Fourth Amendment and the Fifth 
Amendment had been understood to protect “privacy” from government 
                                                  
26 U.S. Const. amend. IX, quoted in , 381 U.S. at 492 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
27 Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 68 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting).
28 William O. Douglas, , 38 N.Y.U. L. REV. 207, 216, 220 (1963).
29 , 381 U.S. at 484.
30 DAVID J. GARROW , LIBER TY AND  SEXU ALITY: THE RIGH T TO PRIVAC Y AND THE MAKING OF 
245-46 (1994). The discussion of privacy rights in the final draft was included at the 
urging of Justice Brennan. . at 246.
31 . at 246-52.
32 ROBER T H. BORK , THE TEMPTING OF AMERIC A: THE POLITIC AL SEDUC TION OF THE LAW 99 
(1991).
33 It was Justice Harlan’s concurring opinion, after all, that took the most open-textured approach 
to the due process clause. , 381 U.S. at 500 (finding “unacceptable” the majority’s 
implication that “the ‘incorporation’ doctrine may be used to the reach of 
Due Process”).
is
Griswold
Griswold
Griswold
See
The Bill of Rights Is Not Enough
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interference for certain purposes, namely on suspicion of untoward activity or to 
secure evidence to be used in a criminal prosecution.34 Those protections were of 
no use to individuals seeking to avoid the reach of the criminal law altogether, 
much less those, like Estelle Griswold and Lee Buxton, who had publicly 
advertised their crimes and made no claim of any unwanted physical invasion.35
Easy enough to understand such a right as sounding in liberty, but grounding it in 
privacy could well be read as restrictive rather than generative.
B. Privacy’s Adolescence:  and
As the constitutional right to privacy grew, it became more enigmatic. In 
, the Court relied on to invalidate a Massachusetts 
ban on the distribution of contraceptives to unmarried people.36 Baird had been 
arrested for giving vaginal foam to an apparently unmarried woman at the close of 
a lecture before at least 1500 people at Boston University.37 Over only one 
dissent, Justice Brennan wrote that “[i]f the right of privacy means anything, it is 
the right of the , married or single, to be free from unwarranted 
governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the 
decision whether to bear or beget a child.”38 A differently inclined Justice might 
have written, “If the right of means anything, it does not license a birth-
control activist to dole out medical devices to an overflow crowd of college 
students.” But by the time of , “privacy” had become a constitutional 
metonym, a word that resonates with the vocabulary of common experience but 
carries a more complicated meaning in the pages of the U.S. Reports.
To be fair, the Court was hardly engaged in doublespeak. The privacy 
right at issue was in substance the woman’s, not Baird’s, and when we speak of 
“private” decisionmaking, we may mean not only that it is physically cached but 
that it is closed to external influence or input. In a liberal society, an individual 
decision either to risk or to invite pregnancy is simply not the community’s to 
make, and there is nothing malapropros in conceiving of that decision as 
grounded in a right to privacy. A difficulty arises, however, when the right has to 
bear the weight of justification for an exemption from abortion restrictions, as it 
did the following year in .
                                                  
34 , Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360, 365 (1959) (“Certainly it is not necessary to accept 
any particular theory of the interrelationship of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments to realize what 
history makes plain, that it was on the issue of the right to be secure from searches for evidence to 
be used in criminal prosecutions or for forfeitures that the great battle for fundamental liberty was 
fought.”).
35 GARROW , note 30, at 201–207.
36 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
37 GARROW , note 30, at 320.
38 , 405 U.S. at 453.
Eisenstadt v. Baird Roe v. Wade
Eisenstadt v. Baird Griswold
individual
privacy
Eisenstadt
Roe v. Wade
See, e.g.
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See supra
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Apart from its much-maligned trimester framework, is not a doctrinal 
aberration. As Justice Brennan certainly knew, his words in could as 
easily have been describing the right to obtain an abortion.39 The Court’s 
conclusion—that “the right of personal privacy includes the abortion decision, but 
that this right is not unqualified and must be considered against important state 
interests in regulation”—was virtually unassailable as doctrine went.40 The 
problem was that this doctrine was inadequate to its broader task. The state’s 
interest in preserving potential human life is spectacularly weighty, and only an 
equally weighty interest could counteract it in a minimally satisfying way. Framed 
in privacy terms, the abortion right seems not to the state’s interest but 
to reject it altogether: Asserting a constitutional right to privacy is precisely a 
declaration that the state may not legitimately be interested. To be private is, after 
all, not to be public. Extending privacy doctrine to abortion thereby abides 
conceiving of the decision whether to terminate a pregnancy as a zero-sum duel
between state and woman, rather than as a respectful weighing of competing but 
equally legitimate interests.
C. : Privacy Come Liberty: From to 
The Court recognized its mistake, at least implicitly, earlier than is often 
thought. With the exception of , which 
applied to the distribution of contraceptives to minors,41 the right to 
privacy has not been used to extend constitutional protection to previously 
unprotected acts since . Feel free to reread the previous sentence, because this 
fact is easy to lose sight of amid the sequins and pyrotechnics of judicial 
confirmation hearings and talk radio. To the extent the Court has expanded the 
scope of substantive due process in the decades since , it has generally done 
so under the auspices of “liberty,” in harmony with the opinions of 
Justices Harlan and White and, as we will see in Part II, with the longstanding 
views of Justice Stevens.
Thus, in , the Court invalidated a
school board’s policy of requiring unpaid maternity leave for pregnant employees 
lasting from five months before their expected delivery date until three months 
after the child’s birth.42 Justice Stewart, who had joined the majority but had 
made clear his distaste for a constitutional right to privacy,43 referred in 
                                                  
39 Justice Brennan in fact circulated his draft, including that momentous sentence, on 
the day was argued for the first time. GARROW , note 30, at 541-42.
40 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 154 (1973).
41 431 U.S. 678, 691–99(1977).
42 414 U.S. 632 (1974).
43 , 410 U.S. at 167 (Stewart, J., concurring).
Roe
Eisenstadt
Roe
outweigh
Carey Casey
Carey v. Population Services International
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Roe
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Cleveland Board of Education v. LaFleur
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to “a right to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion” into the “decision 
whether to bear or beget a child,” but he conspicuously avoided any reference to 
the word “privacy.”44
Likewise, in , the Court struck down the 
city’s cramped definition of “family” for the purpose of public housing 
eligibility.45 Justice Powell’s plurality opinion referenced a longstanding 
“freedom of personal choice in matters of marriage and family life” and “a private 
realm of family life which the state cannot enter” but did not rely on any right to 
privacy as such.46 If there was any doubt that the plurality was self-consciously 
distancing itself from the right to privacy, Justice Powell put those doubts to rest 
by quoting extensively from Justice Harlan’s dissent in and 
concurrence in , both of which spoke in terms of liberty rather than 
privacy.47
Later, in , Chief Justice 
Rehnquist wrote that “the Due Process Clause protects an interest in life as well as 
an interest in refusing life-sustaining medical treatment,”48 but elsewhere in the 
opinion he was careful to note that “[a]lthough many state courts have held that a 
right to refuse treatment is encompassed by a generalized constitutional right of 
privacy, we have never so held [and] believe this issue is more properly analyzed 
in terms of a Fourteenth Amendment liberty interest.”49 And again, in 
, in affirming the right of a mother to refuse visitation to her children’s 
paternal grandparents, Justice O’Connor grounded the Court’s decision in liberty 
interests and made no reference to a constitutional right to privacy.50
Whatever might be said of cases like and , the right to 
privacy had no better bellwether than . For if there is no 
right to a consensual, noncommercial sexual relationship in a private 
home with the partner of one’s choice, then there is no right deserving of the 
                                                  
44 , 414 U.S. at 640.
45 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
46 . at  499. Powell’s reference to a “private realm of family life” derives not from and 
its progeny but from , 321 U.S. 158 (1944), which upheld application of 
the child labor laws of Massachusetts to the niece of a Jehovah’s Witness.
47 , 431 U.S. at 501 (quoting Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542-43 (1961) (Harlan, J., 
dissenting)); . at 503 (quoting , 381 U.S. at 501 (Harlan, J., concurring in the 
judgment)); . at 503 n.12 (quoting , 367 U.S. at 551-52 (Harlan, J., dissenting)). 
Justice Harlan’s dissent recognized a right to privacy in the home embraced within the 
“liberty” protected by the due process clause. , 367 U.S. at 551. But Harlan made clear that the 
privacy inherent in the institution of marriage proves a special case for protection that does not 
extend, for example, to “adultery, homosexuality, fornication and incest, . . . however privately 
practiced.” . at 552-53.
48 497 U.S. 261, 281 (1990).
49 . at 279 n.7.
50 530 U.S. 57, 65–67(2000).
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name. Michael Hardwick was arrested after a police officer happened upon him 
engaged in oral sex with another man in his own bedroom.51 In his majority 
opinion rejecting Hardwick’s claim to constitutional protection, Justice White 
said, “We first register our disagreement with the Court of Appeals and with 
respondent that the Court’s prior cases have construed the Constitution to confer a 
right of privacy that extends to homosexual sodomy and for all intents and 
purposes have decided this case.”52 Although the Court of Appeals had indeed 
relied on the right to privacy in invalidating the statute,53 Laurence Tribe’s 
Supreme Court oral argument on Hardwick’s behalf had made no reference to any 
general right to privacy.54 Indeed, at oral argument only Michael Hobbs, counsel 
for the state of Georgia, had framed the requested right in constitutional privacy 
terms, and he had done so at three different points in his argument.55 Likewise, 
the state’s merits brief had mentioned “the right of privacy” at every available 
opportunity, even using the phrase as the title of a section of the brief, whereas the 
respondent’s brief had focused much more on the inadequacy of Georgia’s 
purported state interest.56 Any right invoked more enthusiastically by its enemies 
than its friends is not long for this Earth.
To be sure, Justice Blackmun’s dissenting opinion opted to “analyze 
respondent Hardwick’s claim in the light of the values that underlie the 
constitutional right to privacy.”57 But Justice Blackmun was a jealous guardian of 
his opinion in , as made plain by his brooding partial dissent in 
,58 and he is perhaps to be 
forgiven for missing the writing on the wall. 
It was more plain to Justice Stevens, whose dissent was joined by
each of the other three dissenters, but not Blackmun.59, The opinion described 
                                                  
51 JO YCE MURDOCH & DEB PRIC E, COUR TING JUSTICE: GAY MEN  AND LESB IANS V. THE 
SUPREME COUR T 277–78 (2001).
52 478 U.S. 186, 190 (1986).
53 Hardwick v. Bowers, 760 F.2d 1202 (11th Cir. 1985).
54 Transcript of Oral Argument, , No. 85-140, at 15–40 (1986).
55 . at 5 (“Thus far this Court has concluded that the right of privacy includes marriage and 
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truly fundamental.”), 13 (“As this Court indicated in , the right of privacy is not 
[absolute].”).
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and dissenting in part) (“And I fear for the darkness as four Justices anxiously await the single 
vote necessary to extinguish the light.”).
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“individual decisions by married persons, concerning the intimacies of their 
physical relationship” as “a form of ‘liberty’ protected by the Due Process 
Clause.”60 Justice Stevens further stated, “In consideration of claims of this kind, 
the Court has emphasized the individual interest in privacy, but its decisions have 
actually been animated by an even more fundamental concern.”61 Then, quoting 
from his opinion as a Seventh Circuit judge in 
, Justice Stevens evidenced his discomfort with the privacy frame:
“These cases do not deal with the individual’s interest in protection from 
unwarranted public attention, comment, or exploitation” but rather “the 
individual’s right to make certain unusually important decisions that will affect 
his own, or his family’s, destiny.”62
The right to set one’s own fundamentally significant projects and plans—
in short, to control one’s destiny—has succeeded “privacy” as the limiting frame 
for the Court’s substantive due process decisions. Thus, in creatively restating the 
holding in , the authors of the joint opinion not only ditched the 
trimester framework but stated early in the opinion that “[t]he controlling word in 
the cases before us is ‘liberty.’”63 The decision whether to terminate a pregnancy 
prior to viability must, we are told, remain the woman’s not because it is none of 
the state’s business, but because it is so very much the woman’s: “The destiny of 
the woman must be shaped to a large extent on her own conception of her 
spiritual imperatives and her place in society.”64 The right to privacy is mentioned 
just twice in the joint opinion, both deep within: first, when the plurality discusses 
the informed consent provision of the Pennsylvania statute, which has inherently 
to do with information exchange rather than decisionmaking; and second, in 
invalidating the spousal notification requirement, where citation to ’s 
admonition that the “privacy” right attaches to the individual rather than to the 
marital couple is irresistible.65 The case is otherwise silent on the right to privacy.
                                                  
60 . at 216.
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63 , 505 U.S. at 846.
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65 . at 883, 896. Unsurprisingly, we see far more overt references of the right to privacy in the 
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privacy,” , 505 U.S. at 926 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in 
part, and dissenting in part), he described the ways in which “[s]tate restrictions on abortion 
violate a woman’s right of privacy,” . at 927, and he argued that state abortion restrictions 
“deprive[] a woman of the right to make her own decision about . . . critical life choices that this 
Court has long deemed central to the right to privacy,” .; . at 929 (“The Court has held 
that limitations on the right of privacy are permissible only if they survive ‘strict’ constitutional 
Fitzgerald v. Porter Memorial 
Hospital
Roe Casey
Eisenstadt
Id
Id
Id
Casey
Id
Id
Casey See generally Living with
Casey
id
id see also id
Greene, The So-Called Right to Privacy, Forthcoming, U.C. Davis Law Review
12
D. The End of Privacy: and 
Given the fault lines on the Rehnquist Court, it was clear that virtually any 
majority opinion in a contested substantive due process case would require the 
agreement of at least two of the three authors of the joint opinion—Justices 
O’Connor, Kennedy, and Souter. So when the Court finally reversed with 
its 2003 decision in , it should not have been surprising that 
Justice Kennedy, echoing his own words in , eschewed the language of 
privacy rights.66 The word “privacy” appears just thrice in the majority opinion: in 
restating the question presented, in restating the holding of , and in a 
verbatim quote from .67 By contrast, the word “liberty” appears more 
than twenty-five times in the majority opinion, including three times in the 
opening paragraph:68
Liberty protects the person from unwarranted government 
intrusions into a dwelling or other private places. In our tradition the State 
is not omnipresent in the home. And there are other spheres of our lives 
and existence, outside the home, where the State should not be a dominant 
presence. Freedom extends beyond spatial bounds. Liberty presumes an 
autonomy of self that includes freedom of thought, belief, expression, and 
certain intimate conduct. The instant case involves liberty of the person 
both in its spatial and more transcendent dimensions.69
From the beginning, one of the knocks on the right of privacy was that the 
Court “did not even intimate an answer to the question, ‘Privacy to do 
what?’”70 “Liberty” may not be inherently better suited to answer that question, 
but it does at least invite conversation about the substance of the protected 
conduct rather than its location or circumstances—its “spatial bounds,” so to 
                                                                                                                                          
scrutiny.”). Chief Justice Rehnquist, purporting to respond to the joint opinion, nonetheless framed 
his argument around a proposition that the joint opinion did not contest: that the Court’s 
substantive due process cases through “do not endorse any all-encompassing ‘right of 
privacy.’” . at 951 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part). 
This disjunction may result from the fact that Rehnquist drafted his opinion on the 
assumption that he was writing for a majority, unaware that the joint opinion was imminent. 
LIND A GREENHOU SE, BECOM ING JUSTICE BLACKMUN 203 (2005).
66 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
67 . at 564, 565.
68 Randy E. Barnett, Lawrence v. Texas, CATO 
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speak. Justice Kennedy is hinting at a freedom of self-definition, which is at least 
a principle, if a question-begging one. Accordingly, the dissent Justice 
Kennedy finds most fertile for his purposes is that of Justice Stevens, not Justice 
Blackmun. Kennedy writes, “Justice Stevens’ analysis, in our view, should have 
been controlling in and should control here.”71
was, overtly, paradoxically, a mortal blow to the constitutional 
right to privacy,72 but the final nail in its coffin was more subtle. In 
, the Court rejected a facial challenge to the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban 
Act of 2003, a federal prohibition on what is professionally known as the intact 
dilation and evacuation method of terminating a pregnancy, even though the act 
did not include an exception for the preservation of maternal health.73 The Court 
split 5–4, and Justice Ginsburg wrote a dissenting opinion that was joined by 
Justices Stevens, Souter, and Breyer. The dissent therefore represented 
the views of the Justices most likely to be sympathetic to a right to privacy. But 
earlier in her career, as a Court of Appeals judge, Ginsburg had said that the 
Court “presented an incomplete justification for its action.”74 She would have 
preferred the majority in to have “added a distinct sex discrimination theme 
to its medically oriented opinion.”75 Referring more to women’s equality would 
have recognized that, because of the social expectations that attend pregnancy, 
childbirth, and child-rearing, “[a]lso in the balance [in abortion cases] is a 
woman’s autonomous charge of her full life’s course— . . . her ability to stand in 
relation to man, society, and the state as an independent, self-sustaining, equal 
citizen.”76  
Justice Ginsburg’s dissent, her first significant abortion opinion in 
fourteen years on the Court, picked up where she had left off more than two 
decades earlier. “As comprehended,” she wrote in , “at stake in 
cases challenging abortion restrictions is a woman’s ‘control over her [own] 
destiny.’ . . . Thus, legal challenges to undue restrictions on abortion procedures 
do not seek to vindicate some generalized notion of privacy; rather, they center on 
a woman’s autonomy to determine her life’s course, and thus to enjoy equal 
citizenship stature.”77 The commingling of equality and liberty interests also 
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appeared in , in which Justice Kennedy said that “[e]quality of treatment 
and the due process right to demand respect for conduct protected by the 
substantive guarantee of liberty are linked in important respects, and a decision on 
the latter point advances both interests.”78 On this conception, the liberty 
component of substantive due process protects an individual’s right to make 
fundamental life decisions on substantively equal terms with others.
Referring to the Court’s substantive due process cases through , 
Justice White wrote in that “none of the rights announced in those cases 
bears any resemblance to the claimed constitutional right of homosexuals to 
engage in acts of sodomy that is asserted in this case.”79 Justice Kennedy in 
and Justice Ginsburg in made clear that five members of the 
Court have settled on a nexus, and it is grounded not in privacy but in liberty and 
equality. Indeed, as we shall see in Part III, the only members of the current Court 
likely to refer to the right to privacy are those who dissent either from its 
fecundity or its very existence. The next Part discusses the role played by Justice 
Stevens in that remarkable doctrinal evolution.
As a naval intelligence officer during World War II, John Paul Stevens 
was part of a team charged with deciphering the Japanese naval code.80
Cryptanalysis requires the codebreaker to unlock the ciphering system that 
identifies the relevant numeric codes and then to translate those codes into 
words.81 A coding system must by necessity be mysterious to outsiders, but it 
must at the same time be transparent to insiders. Code—good code, anyway—is 
designed to be understood. Indeed, that’s the key to cracking it.82
Law, too, is a kind of code, and it can be mysterious to the uninitiated.I 
have discussed the ways in which the right to privacy was put to work beyond its 
talents. This Part discusses Justice Stevens’s recognition that, circa 1975, 
constitutional privacy doctrine was in need of a better idiom. Section A articulates 
Justice Stevens’s vision of liberty, which was, like Justice Harlan’s and Justice 
White’s, more grounded conceptually but at the same time more generative than 
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privacy. Section B then explains how Justice Stevens’s conception of liberty has 
indeed generated doctrine consistent with his substantive constitutional views.
A. Justice Stevens and the Liberty Clause
In trying to bridge the divide between Justice Black and Justice Harlan, 
Justice Douglas had created a paradox: an unenumerated right grounded in 
positive law. Such rights are not unknown to constitutional law, as Justice 
Douglas sought to demonstrate with his reference in to the right of 
association, which lives in the long shadow of the First Amendment.83 But as such 
rights expand into realms not originally contemplated by their begetters, and not 
welcomed by their detractors, they become too easy a target to sustain a 
controversial doctrine. Abortion rights do not sound in privacy. That does not 
mean, of course, that such rights do not deserve constitutional protection, but 
having to speak in the language of privacy unduly complicates the task of those 
who would defend them.
Then-Judge John Paul Stevens, a Nixon appointee to the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, faced the paradox of constitutional privacy in full 
form in 1975, when he had before him a case in which several married couples 
sued for paternal access to the delivery room of a public hospital during the birth 
of their children.84 The plaintiffs were claiming a privacy right, not to 
state access to an intimate event or decision, but to it for themselves; the 
state’s presence was not only conceded as legitimate but was in fact invited. This 
was all profoundly weird, and Judge Stevens effectively said so: 
It is somewhat unfortunate that claims of this kind tend to be 
classified as assertions of a right to privacy. For the group of cases that 
lend support to plaintiffs’ position do not rest on the same privacy concept 
that Brandeis and Warren identified in their article in the 1890 Edition of 
the .85
Significantly, however, in distancing himself from the right to privacy, Judge
Stevens did not retreat to the strict formalist position associated with Justices 
Black and Stewart in .86 Rather, Stevens laid out an affirmative vision of 
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constitutional liberty that is tethered neither to the concept of privacy nor to any 
formula dictated by the Constitution’s text. Referring to , , and 
, he said, “The character of the Court’s language in these cases brings to mind 
the origins of the American heritage of freedom—the abiding interest in 
individual liberty that makes certain state intrusions on the citizen’s right to 
decide how he will live his own life intolerable.”87
This should sound familiar, of course, since it approximates the Court’s 
current doctrine. As Part I discusses above, Justice Stevens wrote his 
opinion into the U.S. Reports in his dissent, and Justice Kennedy in turn 
relied on that dissent for the majority in . Crucially, Justice Stevens’s 
formulation is no more restraining than Justice Douglas’s or Justice Blackmun’s, 
and it is in some respects less so. In he quoted Justice Harlan’s 
statement in :
Judicial self-restraint will not . . . be brought about in the ‘due 
process’ area by the historically unfounded incorporation formula 
advanced by [Black and Stewart]. It will be achieved in this area, as in 
other constitutional areas, only by continual insistence upon respect for the 
teachings of history, solid recognition of the basic values that underlie our 
society, and wise appreciation of the great roles that the doctrines of 
federalism and separation of powers have played in establishing and 
preserving American freedoms.88
One is reminded of Justice Sutherland’s statement, dissenting in 
, that “[s]elf-restraint belongs in the domain of will and not of 
judgment.”89 A belief that judicial restraint is a constitutional value, but an 
endogenous one, enables Justice Stevens to be comfortable taking the 
constitutional term “liberty” at face value, as the freedom to follow the dictates of 
one’s conscience bound only by the competing needs of a reasonable sovereign.90
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Justice Stevens made the point more explicitly in his dissenting opinion in 
, in which the Court held that prison inmates have no 
constitutional liberty interest in avoiding transfer to a prison facility with 
materially worse conditions.91 Justice Stevens criticized the majority’s implication 
that a protected liberty interest must originate either in the Constitution or in a 
statute. Stevens wrote:
If man were a creature of the State, the analysis would be correct. 
But neither the Bill of Rights nor the laws of sovereign States create the 
liberty which the Due Process Clause protects. The relevant constitutional 
provisions are limitations on the power of the sovereign to infringe on the 
liberty of the citizen. The relevant state laws either create property rights, 
or they curtail the freedom of the citizen who must live in an ordered 
society. Of course, law is essential to the exercise and enjoyment of 
individual liberty in a complex society. But it is not the source of liberty, 
and surely not the exclusive source.92
Like Justice Harlan and Justice White before him, Justice Stevens countered 
Douglas’s expansive positivism with a careful naturalism.93 Rather than 
protecting an unenumerated right grounded in positive law, Justice Stevens’s due 
process clause—what he has called the “liberty clause”—protected an enumerated 
right grounded in natural law.
B. Reaching the Right Side of History
Quite unlike Harlan’s or White’s, however, Stevens’s substantive views 
on the reach of the due process clause have carried the day.94 Harlan intimated in 
that the moral judgments of the community may justify State 
prohibitions on, for example, “adultery, fornication and homosexual practices.”95
That is very nearly the opposite of the position Justice Stevens espoused in his 
dissent, and which Justice Kennedy in lifted verbatim from 
Justice Stevens: “the fact that the governing majority in a State has traditionally 
viewed a particular practice as immoral is not a sufficient reason for upholding a 
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law prohibiting the practice.”96 And although Harlan left the Court two months 
before (and died two weeks after) was argued, Charles Fried, who drafted 
, suggests quite plausibly that “[t]he argumentation of Harlan’s dissent in 
[ ], as well as his refusal to condemn laws proscribing adultery, fornication, 
and homosexuality leave little doubt that he would have held with the dissenters 
in .”97 For his part, Justice White of course dissented in and wrote the 
now-discredited majority opinion in .98
It is difficult to know what gives one judge a better eye for doctrinal 
progression than another. I want to suggest, though, that crucial to Justice 
Stevens’s conception of constitutional liberty is an appreciation for its connection 
to equality, and a law sense that enables him to follow their respective arcs where 
they lead him. As I discuss above, a majority of the current Court has come to the 
view that denial of certain particularly significant liberty interests inexorably 
effects a denial of equal protection of the laws.99 Restricting a woman’s right to 
terminate her pregnancy subjects her body and her subsequent life to a set of 
physical and social burdens that cannot befall a man. Denying someone the right 
to sexual intimacy with the partner of his choice denies him a choice that he may 
consider central to his humanity, and that others not so denied consider central to 
theirs.
Conversely, denying an individual certain public benefits on an arbitrary 
basis, such as the color of her skin, denies her a liberty interest without sufficient 
justification. That, as Justice Stevens has noted, was the basis for the Court’s
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decision in .100 “The self-evident proposition enshrined in the 
Declaration [of Independence]—the proposition that all men are created equal—is 
not merely an aspect of social policy that judges are free to accept or reject,” he 
told a University of Chicago Law School audience in 1991. “It is a matter of 
principle that is so firmly grounded in the ‘traditions of our people’ that it is 
properly viewed as a component of the liberty protected by the Fifth 
Amendment.”101 On this view the equal protection clause and the due process 
clause are mutually reinforcing rather than mutually exclusive.102
Linking the liberty interests in obtaining an abortion or in engaging in 
homosexual conduct to the constitutional equality concerns that they implicate 
would not likely have impressed Justice Harlan. The equal protection clause was 
first applied to sex discrimination in ,103 which was argued the month 
after Harlan retired from the Court. No Court majority was willing even to apply 
heightened scrutiny to sex discrimination until 1976, five years after Harlan’s 
death.104  It was not that the Court just hadn’t gotten around to reaching such 
claims or applying such standards; rather the same women’s movement that 
pushed passage of the Equal Rights Amendment altered the cultural landscape 
and, consequently, the Court’s case law in the 1970s.105 Justice Harlan authored 
the Court’s unanimous opinion in , which upheld Florida’s 
practice of presumptively excluding women from jury service on the ground that 
“woman is still regarded as the center of home and family life.”106 Questioning an 
abortion ban on sex equality grounds would have been an impossibly difficult 
leap for him.
Likewise, Justice Harlan did not live to see the full flowering of the gay 
rights movement. Although the Warren Court did not have much opportunity to 
confront gay rights issues, we get a glimpse of Justice Harlan’s attitude towards 
gays in , in which the Court reversed the Post Office 
Department’s determination that a number of gay soft porn magazines were 
obscene.107 Writing only for himself and for Justice Stewart, Justice Harlan 
announced the opinion of the Court but wrote gratuitously that the magazines
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were “dismally unpleasant, uncouth, and tawdry” and described their readers as
“unfortunate persons.”108 At the time of Harlan’s death, gays and lesbians were 
not only subject to anti-sodomy laws in many states but they remained ineligible 
for federal civil service employment.109 In a due process challenge to that 
exclusion in 1960, the Court had denied cert without any internal dissent.110 Five 
years after Harlan’s death, the Court summarily affirmed—without merits briefing 
or oral argument—the denial of a challenge to Virginia’s sodomy ban.111 Three 
Justices indicated that they would have noted probable jurisdiction and scheduled 
the case for oral argument: Justice Brennan, Justice Marshall, and Justice 
Stevens.112
It may be surprising that a well-bred Republican antitrust lawyer would be 
so responsive to the sexual revolution, but Justice Stevens’ writings on and off the 
bench have long emphasized a judge’s capacity for change. At a symposium on 
his career hosted by Fordham Law School in 2005, Justice Stevens said that 
“learning on the job is essential to the process of judging.”113 He has explained, 
for example, that when he first became a federal judge, he believed that the due 
process clause “provides procedural safeguards, but has no substantive 
[content].”114 He changed his view after rereading the opinions of Justice Holmes 
in 115 and Justice Brandeis in .116
Justice Stevens has also said that careful examination of the relevant precedents 
and arguments likewise changed his view over whether political patronage in civil 
service violated the First Amendment.117 Witness as well his transformation into a 
death penalty abolitionist,118 a generation after co-authoring the controlling 
opinion in , which lifted the Court’s nationwide moratorium and 
announced, , that “the punishment of death does not invariably violate 
the Constitution.”119 Instead of assuming that that view must be true for all time, 
Justice Stevens in “relied on [his] own experience” in concluding 
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that the death penalty has become cruel and unusual punishment in violation of 
the Eighth Amendment.120
Like a conscientious jurist, law itself can change as the society that 
sustains it grows older and wiser. Justice Stevens’ confidence in that quality 
underwrites his lack of formalism. Unlike Justice White, for example, Justice 
Stevens has long insisted that the tiers-of-scrutiny analysis that remains a feature 
of the Court’s equal protection jurisprudence too rigidly describes the proper 
analysis.121 Lacking the formalist’s preference for clear rules likewise, I think, has 
sensitized Justice Stevens to the interdoctrinal overlay that drives his view of the 
importance of liberty to equality, and vice versa. A judge who believes there is, in 
effect, more than one equal protection clause is bound to have a difficult time in 
seeing which one dovetails with the due process clause, and how.122 By contrast, 
Justice Stevens can approach his task unburdened by any compulsion to maintain 
sharp cleavages between doctrinal areas and self-conscious about the need to be 
receptive to new arguments and perspectives. It is perhaps more accurate, then, to 
say that his responsiveness to the claims of the sexual revolution is not in spite of 
his background as a well-bred Republican antitrust lawyer, but is rather because 
of it.
The decaying of the right to privacy described in Part I and effectively 
presaged by Justice Stevens as early as 1975 has gone largely unnoticed in our 
constitutional politics. At the 2006 Supreme Court nomination hearing of Justice 
Alito, the very first question he was asked, by Senator Specter, was whether “the 
Liberty Clause and the Constitution carries with it the right to privacy.”123 At 
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Chief Justice Roberts’s hearing months earlier, Senators Specter, Biden, Kohl, 
Schumer, and Feinstein all asked Roberts whether he believed in a constitutional 
right to privacy; Biden and Schumer asked the same question in two separate 
rounds of questioning.124 Senator Specter opened the hearing by confronting
Roberts with a memo Roberts had written in 1981 as an attorney in the Justice 
Department in which he had referred to the “so-called ‘right to privacy.’”125
Both Roberts and Alito answered that there is a right to privacy in the 
Constitution deriving from , even though I have suggested that 
effectively marked constitutional privacy’s doctrinal end. That doesn’t 
mean Roberts and Alito were necessarily wrong. Both men surely recognized that 
the questions they were being asked were not doctrinal but political. In the latter 
realm, of course, describing oneself as opposed to the right to privacy is but 
shorthand for declaring one’s hostility to the constitutional right to an abortion. 
That is so even if, in the realm of doctrine, the abortion right is no longer 
conditioned on a right to privacy. A judge who describes herself as opposed to the 
right to privacy also risks the demonization that befell Robert Bork in 1987. Try 
as he did to argue, in the way of many academics, that the Connecticut ban on 
contraceptive use might have been struck down on desuetude or some other 
ground, Bork’s rejection of the right to privacy is widely viewed as having 
doomed his nomination.126 His was a fate Roberts and Alito were doubtless eager 
to avoid.
The Bork nomination demonstrated that disclaiming a right to privacy was 
no way to ingratiate oneself with certain segments of the public. But just as 
surely, applying the “so-called” label signals fraternity with many of the rest, 
becoming something of a secret handshake on the right.127 The “so-called”
formulation boasts a distinguished pedigree within conservative legal circles: it 
was used not only by Roberts in that 1981 memo, but by the Reagan Justice 
Department in its 1988 Guidelines on Constitutional Litigation;128 by Scalia in his 
dissenting opinion in ;129 and by Federalist Society co-founder Steven 
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Calabresi in his introduction to a volume on the history of the originalism 
debate.130
The label had more humble beginnings. The formulation appears to have
first been used by New York Court of Appeals judge Alton Parker in the case of 
.131 Abigail Marie Roberson’s claim 
had nothing to do with contraception, abortion, or sexual intimacy. Rather, she 
wanted equitable relief and damages for the unauthorized use of her likeness—
“said to be a very good one”—in an advertisement for Franklin Mills Flour.132
Referring to the celebrated Warren and Brandeis article, Judge Parker 
dismissively wrote that “[t]he so-called right to privacy is . . . founded upon the 
claim that a man has the right to pass through this world . . . without having his 
picture published, his business enterprises discussed, his successful experiments 
written up for the benefit of others, or his eccentricities commented upon . . . .”133
Roberson lost, but the (so-called) “so-called right to privacy” has since peppered 
the opinions of state and federal courts. Nearly all such references echo that of 
Prosser and Keeton, who speak of “the so-called ‘right of privacy’” in the context 
of unwanted publicity or commercial exploitation rather than immunity from state 
morals legislation.134
The strange career of the right to privacy may suggest an amendment to 
Robert Dahl’s famous observation that “the policy views dominant on the Court 
are never for long out of line with the policy views dominant among the 
lawmaking majorities of the United States.”135 Dahl’s suggestion is that the 
political branches have a certain corrective capacity that makes the legal doctrine 
of the Court tend to follow the political predilections of majorities rather than 
those of minorities. But defenses of the right to privacy show a converse order of 
influence. Biden’s belief “with every fiber of [his] being” in a general right to 
privacy is one that he shares with perhaps no one on the Court.136 The Court 
invented, and then abandoned, the right to privacy, but its initial use as a 
justification for politically relevant doctrine nominated it as a litmus test in the 
politics of the confirmation process. Its potency as such a test makes it insensitive 
to the Court’s doctrinal evolution. Jack Balkin and Sanford Levinson have argued
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that political parties change positive constitutional law over time by using the 
appointments process to effect what Balkin and Levinson call “partisan 
entrenchment.”137 Certain doctrinal formulae and rhetoric, such as the right to 
privacy, can likewise influence constitutional politics through what one might call 
doctrinal entrenchment. Confirmation fights are prime locales for both forms of 
entrenchment: a judicial formulation can infest the politics of judging every bit as 
much as a President’s politics can take over the Court.
There are good reasons, however, for progressives to take the Court’s 
more recent cues on the right to privacy. I have argued that the right to privacy 
faces certain rhetorical challenges in justifying a right to abortion.138 Those 
challenges are more acute in the current methodological climate on the Court and 
within the legal academy. Consider the words of Chief Justice Roberts at the 
Rehnquist Center Lecture at the University of Arizona James E. Rogers College 
of Law:
When Justice Rehnquist came onto the Court, I think it’s fair to say 
that the practice of constitutional law—how constitutional law was 
made—was more fluid and wide-ranging than it is today, more in the 
realm of political science. . . . Now, over Justice Rehnquist’s time on the 
Court, the method of analysis and argument shifted to the more solid 
grounds of legal arguments—what are the texts of the statutes involved, 
what precedents control.139
Roberts’s perspective is somewhat hortatory, but it is safe to say that the Court, 
and the legal and academic discourses that encircle it, are less hospitable than they 
once were to non-textual arguments.140 The transformation of sexual intimacy and 
abortion from privacy to liberty rights accommodates politically popular liberal 
demands for a progressive Constitution with legally ascendant conservative 
demands for one whose text is authoritative.141
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It was Justice Douglas’s aim to ground the substantive due process right to 
use contraceptives more firmly in the text of the Bill of Rights than Justice Harlan 
or Justice White would have it, but he failed to do so. “Liberty” is hardly self-
defining, but it can boast three appearances in the Constitution, including in the 
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments142—that’s of course three more than 
“privacy.”143 A case like , then, was not an example of finding a new 
right in the Constitution but rather defining an ancient and enumerated one. 
Justice Stevens makes that point to great rhetorical effect in : “I 
had thought it self-evident that all men were endowed by their Creator with 
liberty as one of the cardinal unalienable rights. It is that basic freedom which the 
Due Process Clause protects, rather than the particular rights or privileges 
conferred by specific laws or regulations.”144
It might be objected that all I have said is merely semantics. That it is 
naive to imagine that the labels judges apply to doctrine drives the results in 
actual cases. That this is so much inside baseball, and the actual winning and 
losing is responsive to other discourses. An article of this scope is not the place to 
stake out and defend a position in the great debates over the elements of judicial 
decisionmaking. If doctrinal labels are nothing more, then the internment of the 
privacy label remains a point worth making. Nonetheless, I do believe that more 
can be said. Whether the Court is hospitable to certain substantive claims seems to 
depend in significant part on the work that is done to change the language in 
which the Court speaks. The decision in , striking 
down the District’s handgun ban, required that the profile and credibility of 
originalism be enhanced.145 The decision in 
, invalidating voluntary public school 
integration plans in Seattle and Louisville, required a makeover of the idea of a 
color-blind Constitution.146 More than any other public institution, the Court’s 
word is its bond; it takes language—of statutes, of regulations, of its own prior 
opinions—seriously, more seriously perhaps than language is usually meant to be 
taken. Referring to a potential class of rights as deriving from liberty rather than 
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privacy is not merely cosmetic. The limited doctrinal reach of privacy, as I have 
endeavored to show, reflects the limitations of language itself.
Going forward, the shift in language I have identified might carry 
consequences for three of the most active doctrinal areas falling under the rubric 
of substantive due process: marriage rights for same-sex couples, adoption by 
gays and lesbians, and the purchase and use of sex toys. Although the 
constitutional right to privacy has its origins in the desire to protect the institution 
of marriage from state interference, the language of privacy rights is an 
exceptionally poor fit for extending constitutional protection to same-sex 
marriage. Marriage is a quintessentially public institution—the notoriety of the 
commitment is a source of its symbolic gravity. As Massachusetts Supreme 
Judicial Court Chief Justice Marshall wrote in 
, the case requiring legal recognition of same-sex marriage in 
Massachusetts, “marriage is at once a deeply personal commitment to another 
human being and a highly public celebration of the ideals of mutuality, 
companionship, intimacy, fidelity, and family.”147 Just as the deeply felt public 
interest in abortion makes “privacy” a non-starter for many abortion rights 
opponents, reliance on privacy interests to extend constitutional marriage rights to 
same-sex couples would give opponents an inviting target for criticism.
Likewise, resorting to a privacy rubric to defend the rights of gays and 
lesbians to adopt children is too easily characterized as discounting—rather than 
overcoming—the traditional public concern for the best interests of the child, 
particularly one in the state’s care. Indeed, the plaintiffs in 
, in which the Court of Appeals 
for the Eleventh Circuit upheld Florida’s ban on adoption by “homosexual[s],” 
raised a marital privacy claim and were rebuffed precisely on the ground that 
adoption is inherently a public affair.148 Judge Birch wrote:
The decision to adopt a child is not a private one, but a public act. 
At a minimum, would-be adoptive parents are asking the state to confer 
official recognition . . . on a relationship where there exists no natural filial 
bond. In many cases they are also asking the state to entrust into their 
permanent care a child for whom the state is currently serving as in loco 
parentis. In doing so, these prospective adoptive parents are electing to 
open their homes and their private lives to close scrutiny by the state.149
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In the absence of and its progeny, no one would think to argue that the 
right to legal adoption presupposes state indifference to the fitness of the 
prospective parents. But the privacy rationale encourages that distracting line of 
argument, to the detriment of the equality rights of gays and lesbians.
Focusing instead on liberty, and by extension on equality, is no guarantee 
of success, and in it was no more successful than the privacy argument.150
But a conversation about equality in marriage or family planning invokes an 
interest that is both compelling and, unlike the right to privacy, exogenous to the 
interest of the state. Even the most monumental of interests in state intervention 
must still remain competitive with the independent mandate to treat persons 
equally in matters of fundamental importance. Adoption and marriage may never 
sound in privacy. But the Constitution’s words do not admit limitation to the 
prejudices of any particular age. Over time, as society evolves—and judges, too—
it may come to be axiomatic that any reasonable conception of equality must 
overcome the speculations of public officials bearing social theories.151
On a third active substantive due process issue, the right to purchase and 
use sex toys, the shift from privacy to liberty offers far less comfort. There is 
currently a circuit split over whether a state may ban the sale of sexual 
gratification devices, with the Eleventh Circuit upholding Georgia’s ban under
rational basis review and the Fifth Circuit invalidating Texas’s prohibition
without specifying a level of scrutiny.152 Both panels assumed without discussion 
that the same analysis applies to a ban on sale as would apply to a ban on use. 
Unlike same-sex marriage or gay adoption, a right to sex-toy use fits comfortably 
within the rubric of privacy. If there is a constitutional right to use sex toys, it is 
very likely because the state has no legitimate business regulating, as such, the 
means through which its constituents reach orgasm.153 By contrast, extending the 
liberty right recognized in and in to the right to use sex toys 
threatens to trivialize it, and thereby unwittingly to undermine efforts to protect 
same-sex marriage and adoption rights.154 Whatever the merits of the three rights, 
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our law, and our legal discourse, will benefit from recognizing that they attach to 
distinct sets of interests.
The right to privacy has what a PR man would call bad optics.155 It is 
missing from the text of the Constitution; it is freighted with the baggage of terms 
like “penumbras” and “emanations;” and it seems at first blush to bear little 
relationship to some of the specific rights with which it has been associated, such 
as abortion and same-sex marriage. Justice Stevens saw as much a quarter-century 
ago, when he wrote for a panel of the Seventh Circuit that privacy was an 
“unfortunate” label for the set of decisional rights warranting protection under 
what he has called the liberty clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. In the years 
since, Justice Stevens has played no small role in nudging the Court itself toward 
the same view. The Justices supporting the rights to abortion and sexual intimacy 
no longer speak in terms of privacy but instead, like Justice Stevens, affiliate 
those rights with an individual’s interest in control of her destiny. Justice Stevens 
and the Court have both recognized that interest as sounding in liberty and 
equality alike.
Retiring the right to privacy may have salutary effects on the framing of 
marriage and adoption rights for gays and lesbians, but both liberals and 
conservatives perceive political benefits in its continued service. Losing privacy 
would deprive conservatives of a favorite bogeyman and, in the eyes of many 
liberals, would endanger the right to an abortion. But just as doctrine must change 
to accommodate our politics, politics must sometimes change to accommodate the 
Court’s doctrine. And so, eventually, it will.
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